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Introduction
Since the forties that Shannon’s theory of information has conceived
information mainly as reduction of uncertainty.
Let T be  a system which has a set of potential states with a value H of
uncertainty. Then the quantity of information of the observed state of the
system is the difference between the amount of uncertainty before and after
the observation. That is,
I = H - H*
where H* is the value of uncertainty after the observation.
If H * = 0,  so that the observation sweeps away all the uncertainty  we have
I  = H.
As a measure of H  that is of the uncertainty of the system, Shannon uses
Entropy : H = - ∑ pl log pj (log base 2).
However, as is easily seen, an information usually means much more than the
reduction of uncertainty (and sometimes it even increases it).
Suppose, for instance that two runners A and B start a 5 Km race. We know
past performances of both runners so that we give to competitor A 60 %
probability of winning and to B 40 %.
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Using the concept of Shannon’s quantity of information we can say that the
message “ B has won” has exactly the same quantity of information than the
message “A has won” since both reduce uncertainty to 0.
However, the first message has more meaning because the occurrence it
describes is a surprise.
There is then, an element of surprise that is important to consider in the
theory of information.
The measure of surprise
In this section we introduce a measure of surprise for a single non repeated
information about a system (if it is the case that there are more than one
observations the measure of surprise may be for instance the distance
between the observed relative frequencies of the states observed and their a
priori probabilities but this is a case that we don’t study here).
Let T be a system with n potential states each with its probability pj.
Suppose that we make an observation on T from which we get the
information that state k has occurred.
Surprise of this information is, by definition
Sk = log [(max pj) / pk] (log base 2)
In the example of the two runners
 SB = log 1.5
From the definition we get directly:
- For each possible observation there is no surprise when all the states have
identical probabilities, unless it occurs a state with probability 0.
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- There is no surprise when the state that occurs is a state with maximum
probability
- When pk = 0 that is when the state that occurs has probability 0, surprise is
infinite.
Note that the definition of the states must be done on the basis of relevant
features of the events for the observer. To see this, suppose that in the former
example the event of A winning was divided in two situations with assumed
identical probability: A crossing the line with the left foot or A crossing the
line with the right foot.
In this new situation we have three potential states. A winning with the left
foot (30% probability); A winning with the right foot (30% probability); B
winning (40 % probability).
Of course the event “B wins” would have surprise 0 but only because we
considered A divided in two situations that are not relevant.
Surprise and entropy
Looking at the definition of surprise we may say that when there is no
previous knowledge about the system there is no surprise.
Conversely, when there is no uncertainty, that is when there is a state with
probability 1 and all the others have probability 0, then surprise is 0 or infinite
(in the event of occurring a state of probability 0).
It is possible to connect more formally surprise and entropy
In our discrete system the state k has the probability pk of occurring.
Therefore the expected value of the surprise (which from now on we call
simply Surprise of the system) is
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S = ∑ pj Sj
That is, since  ∑ pj = 1
S = log (max pj) - ∑  pj log pj = log (max pj) + H
When the probability of the state of maximum probability is kept constant
then  surprise and entropy both increase or decrease simultaneously.
However, in most situations the variation of the uncertainty is associated with
a variation of the probability of the state with maximum probability, so that
in this case S and H may be inversely related.
For instance, if all the states have identical probability, surprise is 0 and the
entropy is maximum. If there is an improvement in our knowledge of the
system so that the number of states with positive probability is kept constant
but with different probabilities,  we acquire new knowledge and therefore
entropy is reduced and H is lower. However, surprise increases from 0 to a
positive value.
It is easily seen that for two states, one with probability p and the other 1- p
the maximum of surprise is obtained for the value p* such that
p* = .782.
For .5≤  p ≤.782  S increases and H decreases. For p > .782 both S and H
decline.
Therefore when knowledge increases surprise may also increase. In social
systems this may be an additional cause for instability as will be seen later on.
In the next section we consider surprise in non-conscious systems, that is
systems formed by non-human elements.
Surprise and non-conscious systems
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The evolution of non-conscious systems as for instance an animal population
in a given territory may be studied using the concept of surprise.
Consider the following example.
Suppose an animal population that has two alternative strategies.
Strategy W1 is a strategy of adaptation and specialization to a given
environment. The other is a strategy W2 of non-specialization.
W1  will give advantage to the population as long as there are no surprises in
the environment . However if the environment is affected by surprising events
W2 may be more advantageous.
Let us give a example.
There are only two possible states for the environment: E1 with probability p
(p> ½) and E2 with probability 1-p. These two states correspond to two
disjoint events.
Suppose that strategy W1 (specialization) gives the following results:
The result Rt= (a+bn) is obtained if state E1 of the environment occurs at time
t and Rt= (c-dn) if  E2 occurs at t, with positive a,b,c e d and n being the
number of sequential periods - immediately preceding t - where E1 was
verified.
That means that if there is a sequence of occurrences of E1 and then one
occurrence of E2 all the gains of specialisation are lost and afterwards  a new
sequence begins with the next first occurrence of E1. On the other hand the
occurrence of E2 after a long sequence of E1 worsens the result.
The strategy W2 of non specialisation corresponds to the case b=d=0 , that is
for each state the result is always the same. The agent does not learn and
adapt itself to the environment.
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It is easy to see (see appendix) that following W1 the expected value at time 0
of the value of n at time t-1 is :
E0(nt-1) = (p-p
t) / (1-p)
For t sufficiently large we have
E0(nt-1) = p/(1-p) ≈ S2  that is, the surprise of state E2.
Therefore, for sufficiently large t the expected value at time 0 of the result at
time t of following W1 is
E0 (Rt) = p(a+ b p/1-p) + (1-p)(c- dp/1-p)
The same for W2 is
E0(Rt) = ap+(1-p)c
So that W1 is a better strategy than W2 if and only if
b/d > (1-p)/p.
If we define log b/d for positive b and d as the degree of specialisation of W1
to the environment when E1 is the state with the highest probability, this
means that W1 is better than W2 if the degree of specialisation is larger than
the symmetric of the Surprise of E2 (S2=log p/(1-p)= - log (1-p)/p ).
That is, the strategy of specialisation is the best under the criterion of the
expected value at time 0 of the result at t if the surprise of E2 is  large. If this
is not the case too much specialised species may eventually be decimated by
other less adapted ones.
It is time now to turn to social systems, that is systems where there are self-
conscious agents that form expectations about future events and that choose
their strategies after assessing expected results.
Surprise and social systems
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In a previous paper (Amaral 1998) we considered social systems as systems
in which the active information (in the sense of Bohm and Hiley 19931) that
directs the system is also subjective information, that is information that has
meaning for individuals.
In that paper we used this notion to study an economic system in which prices
are simultaneously active and subjective information.
If Q is the quantity of active information in the price vector (in the paper we
suggest a measure for Q, which can also be interpreted as the ability of the
active information in guiding the system) and if H is the quantity of subjective
information (entropy) the ratio Q / H gives a measure of the efficiency of the
information that guides the system.
However, if H declines the efficiency may not increase.
This can happen if the surprise increases.
 An increase in  surprise causes a perturbation on the system that may cause a
decline in Q, that is, in the ability of the active information in guiding the
system.
Let us see an example.
Let A and B be two economic agents. A uses an input that is part of the
production of B in the previous period. With this input A produces an output,
part of which is supplied to B in the same period.
In a formal way x being production
xAt = f (xBt-1)
xBt = g (xAt)
with f and g increasing functions.
                                                       
1 According to their definition (p.35) there is active information when a form having very little energy
enters into and directs a much greater energy.
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We get
xAt = F (xAt-1) ,  xBt = G (xBt-1)
B has some knowledge of reality and operates with this knowledge. Suppose
that there is a stationary state x* and that in case that there is no surprise B
keeps to that stationary state. If he is surprised he leaves the stationary state
and the distance increases with the level of surprise.
With this assumption we may write
| xB0 - xB*| =  z ( S0 ),  z being an increasing function with z(0) = 0 and S0 the
surprise at time 0.
After t periods if xB0 >  xB*
xBt = G
(t) ( xB* + z (S0) )
and the behaviour of the agents will depend on the behaviour of the respective
dynamic systems which may very complex if they are non-linear.
In complex systems  the active information may loose or reduce its ability to
direct the system and that is why the ratio Q/H may decline even when H
declines if this decline in H increases at the same time the surprise.
An other example may be seen in the context of Keynes trade cycle theory.
Keynes and  cycles. Thoughts on economic policy
As it is well known Keynes in his General Theory advanced some ideas on
business cycles in the chapter “Notes on the trade cycle”.
In that chapter he considers that  crisis, that is the substitution of a declining
trend for an increasing one are some times violent, something that on the
contrary does not usually happen in the upswing turn of the cycle.
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This fact is explained according to Keynes by the circumstance that in crisis
there is a collapse of the marginal efficiency of capital, which, being an
expectation is prone to deep variations in the psychological climate.
In other words, surprise has an important role in the theory of the cycle,
mainly in what concerns the downswing turn, when a negative surprise
change expectations and animal spirits leading to a reduction of the marginal
efficiency of capital and therefore to a reduction in investment and because of
the multiplier effect in economic activity.
This turn will be sharper the less entrepreneurs are prepared to cope with
unexpected situations that is, the less they are able to react positively to
surprise.
And this leads us to some thoughts on economic policy.
Uncertainty has a bad name in economics. The more uncertain is the
economic environment the less efficient are economic agents. That is why it
pays to spend resources in increasing knowledge and therefore in reducing
uncertainty.
In economic policy a role is usually given to the authorities in reducing
uncertainty (in the sixties indicative planning was justified as an instrument
for reducing uncertainty) and most economists think that some kinds of
information  are public goods that should be supplied by the government.
But  is reduction of uncertainty always beneficial?
The truth is that, as we have seen, reduction of uncertainty may be associated
with an increase in expected surprise and that means that problems of stability
may arise when we reduce uncertainty. Therefore reduction of uncertainty is
not always beneficial.
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The rational expectations theory assumes that economic agents are rational in
the sense that for deciding on their behaviour they use a distribution of
probability for the future which coincides with the objective distribution
(whatever an objective distribution means).
 The justification for this hypothesis (which personally I find preposterous)
may perhaps lie in the assumption that non rational agents are less efficient
and therefore are expelled by rational agents.
If what we being saying about surprise is true this assumption is not valid.
It does not always pay to be rational, that is to use the “objective” probability
distribution for decisions, unless we are prepared to cope with surprise.
The problem is that it is extremely difficult to cope with surprise in a
“rational” way since it is not usually possible in advance to assess the
consequences of being surprised.
Therefore it is at least controversial to say that the authorities should try to
reduce all the types of uncertainty of economic agents. If they do this
(assuming that is possible) they are creating conditions for more efficient
behaviours but they are perhaps also creating more instability and in the end
difficulties for the economic system.
There is I think a good case for keeping a system flexible to cope with
surprise even if this mean more uncertainty and less efficiency. In political
terms is a good case for tolerance and for not trying to reduce the horizon of
variability for groups and institutions.
The more a society is prepared for surprise, that is the more there is
variability in the way groups and institutions see society, the more a social
system can survive and prosper.
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The problem becomes even more complex when we introduce the issue of co-
ordination of strategies.
Problems of co-ordination
A co-ordination problem exists when what is more rational for every agent to
do is not what is the best for the society as a whole.
Problems of co-ordination may occur due to uncertainty but also because of
surprise, as we can see in the following example.
Suppose that there are two agents A1 and A2 both with two possible strategies
W1 and W2 which for a matter of simplification we assume that have exactly
the same outcomes for each agent.
There are two possible states E1 and E2 with respectively probability p and 1-
p.
The matrices of outcomes for the two states are (remember that we assumed
that the outcomes are identical for each agent) where the first digit is the
outcome for A1 and the second for A2
                                            State E1                                State E2
                                      A2 plays                               A2 plays
A1 plays                      W1               W2                     W1                W2
W1                                        (8 8)             (10 3)                (0 0)               (0 2)
W2                          (3 10)             (5 5)                (2 0)               (2 2)
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It is easy to see that if 2/7< p < 2/5 the best strategy for the society according
to the maximum expected value is strategy W2 but for each player the best
strategy is W1.
Suppose for instance p = 1/3 .
We have for A1 (and the same for A2)
2
E (W1 W1) = 1/3 8 + 2/3 0 = 8/3 and E (W1 W2) = 1/3 10 + 2/3 0 = 10/3
E (W2 W1) = 1/3 3+2/3 2 = 5/3    and E (W2 W2) = 1/3 5+2/3 2=9/3
so that W1  is really the best strategy for each agent. But of course if both
follow W1 we have E(W1 W1) = 1/3 8+ 2/3 0 = 8/3 and if both follow W2
E(W2 W2)= 1/3 5 + 2/3 2=9/3 and this is a better outcome.
More generally, suppose that aij is the outcome for A1 in state E1 when he
plays strategy Wi and A2 strategy j and bij the same for state E2 assuming both
players identical and that a21< a11 , a22< a 12 , a22 < a11, b11< b21 , b12< b22 and
b11< b22.
Then it is easy to see that if
 F1 = min [ (a11- a21)/(b21-b11), (a12 - a22)/(b22-b12)] > (1-p)/p > (a11-a22)/( b22-
b11) = F2
the best strategy for each agent  is not the best strategy for the society.
On the other hand if F1 > 1 > F2 with Fi near 1 this non co-ordination is
associated with uncertainty (high entropy). But if F1< 1 this may be
associated not with uncertainty but with a high level of expected surprise.
Therefore according to the world that the agents face it may be uncertainty or
surprise that is associated with non co-ordination.
                                                       
2 E (Wi Wk) stands for “the expected result for player A1 when he follows Wi given that A2 follows Wk”.
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Till this moment we have dealt with surprise supposing that there are no
errors of judgement. But of course many surprising situations have in their
roots a misconception of the probability of the potential outcomes.
Let us consider this question in the following section.
Surprise and error
Suppose that some agent has a probability distribution for n potential states pj
and suppose that the “objective” probability distribution is qj.
The expected surprise is therefore
S = ∑ qj log (pk / pj) where pk = max pj
For each j this expression can be put in the form
qj log pk + qj log (qj / pj) - qj log qj
summing we get
S = log pk + D (q, p) + H
where D(p,q) is  the Kullback-Leibler mesure of divergence between the two
distributions ( see, for instance Aoki  1996, p.46 and Joyce, 1999, p.215).
Therefore we can interpret surprise as the sum of three components:
- the maximum probability pk that the agent considers. It can be used as a
measure of the specialisation or adaptation of the agent to the environment. A
very specialised agent considers a high value for pk.
- the error D(q,p) of the agent is assessing the distribution of probability of
the states
- the “objective” uncertainty of the environment given by the entropy H(X).
I think that this partition gives a useful framework for analysing systems in a
large number of areas including evolution theory and economics.
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Conclusion
For a large number of systems there  are probably two principles in action.
A principle of efficiency that is essential for enhancing individual survival,
growth and reproduction
A principle of surprise that means that the elements or individuals of the
system should be kept open to surprise, which is a principle essential for the
survival of the species or the group.
There is a tension between these two principles. The principle of efficiency
leads to more adaptation and specialisation but this is not always the best
strategy.
As we have seen some models can de thought using these two principles.
Suppose an economy that specialises in a given sector or product. This will
increase its competitiveness and growth. But unless this specialisation is
compatible with the permanence of less specialised firms, that is with firms
that can survive even behaving with less knowledge or always keeping open
to alternative environments, the specialisation may be dangerous because is
vulnerable to surprise.
In biology some features of the evolution of species may perhaps also be
interpreted using this framework.
Economists have traditionally considered uncertainty as a trouble. And in a
sense they are right. Dealing with uncertainty means decreasing efficiency.
However I am not sure that trying to reduce uncertainty and adapting
behaviour to a less uncertain environment is always the best strategy. This
paper gives some indication that in some cases this strategy may enhance the
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performance of the individuals but may endanger the group and finally the
individual himself.
Perhaps it is not always rational to be rational.
                                               Appendix
Additional results
Addition
Surprises are additive. That means if there are two independent sets of
potential states X and Y we have SXY = SX + SY (this is a direct result of the
additivity of the entropies of two independent systems).
That means that when an agent gets more independent information he can
also be more surprised.
Maximum surprise
If pj is a set of finite potential states, the maximum value for S is obtained
when the state of maximum probability has probability pk given by the
equation
e 1/pk (1 - pk) / pk = n - 1
and all the other states have equal probabilities, that is
pl = (1 - p ) / (n - 1)  for l ≠ k
(the proof is straightforward and is obtained from the maximization of S
subject  to  ∑ pj  = 1)
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The expected value  E(nt-1)
At 0 the values of n at time t-1 have the following distribution of probability:
                   Values of n                             Probability
                         0                                            1-p
                         1                                           p(1-p)
                         2                                           p2(1-p)
                        …                                           …
                        t-3                                           pt-3 (1-p)
                        t-2                                           pt-2 (1-p)
                        t-1                                           pt-1
and the expected value
E(nt)=p(1-p)+2p
2(1-p) + … +(t-2)pt-2 (1-p)+(t-1)pt-1=(1-p)[p+2p2+…+(t-
2)pt-2] + (t-1)pt-1=
       = p+p2+…+pt-2 - (t-2)pt-1+(t-1)pt-1 = p(1-pt-2)/(1-p)+pt-1=(p-pt)/(1-p)
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